The talk will discuss informational lower bounds of approximate Nash equilibrium in two complexity models: Query Complexity and Communication Complexity. For both models we prove exponential (in the number of players) lower bound on the complexity of computing $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium, for constant value of approximation $\epsilon$. 

**Abstract:**

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**THE WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE**

**FACULTY OF MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE**

Foundations of Computer Science Seminar

Room 155, Ziskind Building
on Monday, Nov 27, 2017
at 14:30

Yakov Babichenko
Technion

Informational Bounds on Approximate Nash Equilibria

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