UAV-Mounted Multi-Functional RIS for Combating Eavesdropping in Wireless Networks

Wen Wang, Wanli Ni, Hui Tian, Yonina C. Eldar, and Dusit Niyato

Abstract—In this paper, we propose an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-mounted multi-functional reconfigurable intelligent surface (MF-RIS) to combat an eavesdropping attack. The proposed UAV-mounted MF-RIS is capable of reflecting and amplifying the desired signal, and emitting the friendly jamming (i.e., artificial noise) simultaneously. As such, the signal received at the legitimate user is significantly enhanced, while destructive interference is generated at the eavesdropper (Eve). In the presence of multiple Eves, we maximize the secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming at the base station, the reflection matrix, and the deployment location of MF-RIS. Then, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve this non-convex problem efficiently. Simulation results show that, through the joint design of UAV and RIS architectures, the proposed MF-RIS can effectively combat eavesdropping and achieve more secure communications compared with existing passive or active RISs.

Index Terms—Multi-functional RIS, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), friendly jamming, secure communications.

I. INTRODUCTION

Due to the broadcast nature of radio channels, wireless communications face the problem of information leakage, especially in the presence of malicious eavesdroppers (Eves) [1]. Although some existing technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) [2] and reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) [3], can enhance secure communication performance to a certain extent by adjusting signal propagation or adding artificial noise, the separate design of these techniques makes it challenging to unleash their full potential. To this end, it is desirable to develop a new UAV-mounted RIS architecture that judiciously combines the aforementioned techniques, so as to effectively combat eavesdropping over the air.

In the literature, some prior works have adopted UAV and/or RIS to safeguard wireless communications between the base station (BS) and users [3]–[8]. As summarized in Table I, the authors of [3] deployed a UAV-mounted passive RIS to relay the signal from the BS to the legitimate user (Bob), in the presence of multiple Eves. Considering the severe path loss of legitimate cascaded links, active RISs were proposed in [4] to enhance the secure transmission by amplifying the reflective signal. However, numerical results in [5] revealed that relying on RISs alone is insufficient to deal with the increasing number of Eves due to the lack of spatial degrees of freedom (DoFs). To degrade the channel quality of potential Eves, the authors of [5]–[8] exploited the benefits of ground and aerial jamming in safeguarding communications. Nevertheless, the ground-based designs in [5] and [6] were limited to terrestrial RIS scenarios where the RIS location is fixed. The UAV in [7] played the role of a BS or jammer, and only one Eve was considered in [6] and [7]. Although an aerial platform carrying an RIS and a friendly jammer was employed in [8], the jammer relies on another fixed RIS to manipulate the signal. From Table I, we observe that most existing works focus on the independent design and optimization of UAV and RIS. So far, how to integrate the hardware of UAV and RIS and efficiently optimize this new joint architecture is still an open problem.

Here, we propose a UAV-mounted multi-functional RIS (MF-RIS) to safeguard wireless communications in the presence of multiple Eves. Specifically, the MF-RIS controller can control each element to switch between the amplification mode (A mode) and the jamming mode (J mode). These elements operating in A mode reflect and amplify the incident signal, while the elements in J mode emit the jamming signal generated by the UAV. In this way, the proposed MF-RIS is able to enhance desired reception and combat malicious eavesdropping simultaneously. Unlike amplify-and-forward relays which require power-consuming radio frequency chains, the MF-RIS realizes signal amplification by using low-power negative resistance components, such as tunnel diodes [4]. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

- To fully exploit the advantages of UAV and RIS, we design a new MF-RIS hardware architecture that integrates signal reflection, amplification, and friendly jamming (i.e., artificial noise) into a UAV-mounted metasurface.
- By jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming and the MF-RIS deployment, we formulate a resource allocation problem to maximize the secrecy rate. Then, an iterative algorithm is proposed to solve the resulting mixed-integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problem efficiently.
- Simulation results show that the MF-RIS prefers to be deployed in proximity to Eves and provides up to 300% higher secrecy rate than that of passive and active RISs.
angle of arrivals (AoAs) of this link [3]. The channels from the MF-RIS to Bob/Eves and from the BS to Bob/Eves, denoted by $g_i$ and $h_i$, are modeled similarly. In particular, $g_i$ is given by 

$$g_i = \sqrt{\frac{d_i}{r_i}} (\sqrt{\frac{r_i}{L_i} h_{i0}^M} + \sqrt{\frac{r_i}{L_i} h_{i0}^N}),$$

with $d_i = ||w_i - w||$. Here, we define $h_i = h_i^H + g_i^H \Theta_i H$ as the combined channel.

Denoting $f$ as the confidential beamforming vector and $s \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$ as the modulated symbol, the signal received at Bob and Eves is given by

$$y_i = h_i f s + g_i^H \Theta_i z + g_i^H \Theta_n x + n_0, \ \forall i \in \{b, \} \cup K,$$

where $z \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, P_j I_M)$ is the jamming vector with power $P_j$, $n_0 \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_0^2)$ denotes the amplification noise introduced at the MF-RIS with per-element noise power $\sigma_0^2$, and $n_0 \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \sigma_0^2)$ is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with mean zero and variance $\sigma_0^2$ received at users. The achievable data rate of Bob and Eves is then given by

$$R_i = \log_2 \left(1 + \frac{|h_i f|^2}{P_i \|g_i^H \Theta_i j\|_F^2 + \sigma_0^2 + \sigma_i^2 \|g_i^H \Theta_i j\|_F^2 + \sigma_0^2} \right), \ \forall i.$$ (3)

II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model

As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a UAV-mounted MF-RIS assisted secure communication system, where an $N$-antenna BS transmits signals to a single-antenna Bob in the presence of $K$ single-antenna independent Eves. The set of Eves is denoted by $K = \{1, \ldots, K\}$. We assume that Eves are active users in the considered system but are not trusted by Bob [4]. The fixed three-dimensional (3D) locations of the BS, Bob, and Eves are denoted by $w_0 = [x_0, y_0, z_0]^T$ and $w_i = [x_i, y_i, z_i]^T$, $\forall i \in \{b, \} \cup K$, respectively. The height of the $k$-th Eve is $h_k$, while the BS, Bob, and other Eves are located on the ground, i.e., $z_0 = z_i = 0$, $\forall i \in \{b, 1, \ldots, K-1\}$, and $z_K = h$. Moreover, the location of the UAV-mounted MF-RIS is $w = [x, y, z]^T$, satisfying $w \in W = \{[x, y, z]^T | x_{\min} \leq x \leq x_{\max}, y_{\min} \leq y \leq y_{\max}, z_{\min} \leq z \leq z_{\max} \}$, where $[x_{\min}, x_{\max}], [y_{\min}, y_{\max}]$, and $[z_{\min}, z_{\max}]$ are the candidate ranges along 3D coordinates [1].

We assume that the MF-RIS is equipped with $M$ elements, forming an $M = M_x \times M_y$ uniform rectangular array. The set of elements is denoted by $M = \{1, \ldots, M\}$. The coefficients for the $A$ and $J$ modes are given by $\Theta_A = A \Theta$ and $\Theta_J = (I_M - A) \Theta$, respectively, with $A = \text{diag}([a_1, \ldots, a_M])$ and $\Theta = \text{diag}(\sqrt{\beta_1 e^{j\theta_1}}, \ldots, \sqrt{\beta_M e^{j\theta_M}})$. Here, $\alpha_m \in [0, 1], \beta_m \in [0, \beta_{\max}], \theta_m \in [0, 2\pi]$ denote the mode indicator, the amplitude, and the phase shift of the $m$-th element, respectively. In particular, $\alpha_0$ indicates that the $m$-th element is in A mode, while $\alpha_m = 0$ indicates that it is in J mode, and $\beta_{\max} \geq 1$ is the maximum amplification factor.

To characterize the performance limit of the considered system, we assume that the channel state information of all involved channel links is perfectly known at the BS by using existing channel estimation methods [9]. We adopt Rician fading for all communication links [3]. Then, the channel from the BS to the MF-RIS is given by

$$H = h_0 \sqrt{\frac{d_0}{d_0^2}} \left(\sqrt{\frac{\rho}{\rho + 1}} H^L + \sqrt{\frac{1}{\rho + 1}} H^{NL}\right),$$

(1)

where $h_0$ is the channel gain with a distance of 1 meter (m), $d_0 = ||w - w_0||$ is the distance between the BS and the MF-RIS, $r_0$ is the corresponding path loss exponent, $\rho$ is the Rician factor, and $H^{NL}$ is the non-LoS component modeled as Rayleigh fading. Here, $H^L$ is the deterministic LoS component related to the angle of departures (AoDs) and

1We use a UAV instead of a balloon as the aerial platform to carry the MF-RIS because UAVs are more flexible and have a power supply to perform friendly jamming. In addition, similar to [7] and [8], we assume that the UAV can maintain a stable flight state and thus the effect of UAV jitter on the achievable system performance can be omitted.
where solving problem (6) are given in Algorithm 1.

The difficulty of solving (6) lies in the rank-one constraint in (6b) and the non-convex constraint $E_k^{-1} \geq \text{Tr} (H_k F)$ in (6d). To deal with the rank-one constraint, we adopt the sequential rank-one constraint relaxation (SROCR) method. Unlike the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) method that drops the constraint directly, SROCR gradually relaxes the constraint to obtain a feasible rank-one solution [10]. Simulation results in [11] have shown the performance gains of SROCR over SDR. Defining $v^{(\ell-1)} \in [0,1]$ as the relaxation parameter in the $\ell$-th iteration, this constraint in the $\ell$-th iteration is relaxed as
\[
(M^{(\ell-1)})^H F(\ell) M^{(\ell-1)} \geq v^{(\ell-1)} \text{Tr} (F(\ell)),
\]
where $M^{(\ell-1)}$ denotes the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of $F^{(\ell-1)}$, and $F^{(\ell-1)}$ is the obtained solution in the $(\ell-1)$-th iteration.

Replacing the non-convex part $E_k^{-1}$ with its FTS, $(E_k^{-1})^{lb} = (2E_k^{-1} - E_k)(E_k^{-1})^{-2}$, constraint $E_k^{-1} \geq \text{Tr} (H_k F)$ is recast as
\[
(E_k^{-1})^{lb} \geq \text{Tr} (H_k F).
\]
Thus, problem (6) is transformed into
\[
\max_{F, E_k, F} R_k^{lb} - \max_{k \in K} R_k
\]
s.t.
\[
\text{Tr} (F) \leq P_{\text{max}}, \quad F \succeq 0, \quad E_k^{-1} \leq \text{Tr} (H_k F),
\]
(9a), (6c), (6e), (6f), (7), (8).

Since problem (9) is a semidefinite program (SDP), it can be solved efficiently via CVX toolbox. Accordingly, the details of solving problem (6) are given in Algorithm 1.

B. MF-RIS Coefficient Design

Given $f$ and $w$, we denote $X = x x^H$, $x \in \{U_A, U_J, U\}$, $U \in \{u_A, u_J, u\}$, where $u_A \in \mathbb{C}^{(M+1) \times 1}$, $u_J \in \mathbb{C}^{M \times 1}$, and $u \in \mathbb{C}^M$. The expressions of $X$ and $x$ are given in (10) at the bottom of this page. Here, $X$ should satisfy the following constraints:
\[
X \succeq 0, \quad \text{rank}(X) = 1, \quad [U_A]_{M+1,M+1} = 1,
\]
(11a)
\[
[X]_{m,m} = \begin{cases} 
\alpha^2 m \beta_m, & \text{if } X = U_A, \\
(1 - \alpha^2) m \beta_m, & \text{if } X = U_J,
\end{cases}
\]
(11b)

We further define $\tilde{H}_i = [\text{diag}(g_i^H) H_i^H]^T f$ and $\tilde{h} = [\tilde{H}_i x_{1,N}]^T f$. Then, (4) is reduced to
\[
\max_{x, E_k, F} R_k^{lb} - \max_{k \in K} R_k
\]
s.t.
\[
E_k^{-1} \leq \text{Tr} (H_k U A), \quad (E_k^{-1})^{lb} \geq \text{Tr} (H_k U A), \forall k, (12b)
\]
\[
F_k \geq \text{Tr} ((P_J U + \sigma^2 I) G_k) + \sigma^2, \forall k, (12c)
\]
\[
F_k \leq \text{Tr} ((P_J U + \sigma^2 I) G_k) + \sigma^2, \forall k, (12d)
\]
\[
\text{Tr} (H_k U A) + P_J \text{Tr} (U J) + \sigma^2 \text{Tr} (U) \leq P_{\text{out}}, (12e)
\]
\[
\alpha m \in [0,1], \beta_m \in [0, \beta_{\text{max}}], \forall m, (11a), (11b), (12f)
\]
where $H_i = h_i^H H_i^H$, $H = \tilde{h}^H H$, and $G_i = g_i^H g_i^H$. Problem (12) is non-convex due to the binary constraint in (12f), the rank-one constraint in (11a), and the highly coupled constraint (11b). The binary constraint is equivalently transformed into the following continuous ones:
\[
\alpha_m - \alpha_m^2 \leq 0, \quad 0 \leq \alpha_m \leq 1, \quad \forall m. \quad (13)
\]
For the non-convex part $-\alpha_m^2$, the FTS is again performed to obtain a linear upper-bound at the feasible point $\{x^{(\ell)}\}$, which is given by $(\alpha_m^{(\ell)})^{ub} = -2\alpha_m^{(\ell)} - \alpha_m^{(\ell)}$, (13).

Similar to the transformation for constraint rank($F$) = 1 in Section III-A, we handle the rank-one constraint rank($X$) = 1 using SROCR. By defining $v^{(\ell-1)} \in [0,1]$, $x^{(\ell-1)}$, and $X^{(\ell-1)}$ to correspond to $x^{(\ell-1)} \in [0,1]$, $x^{(\ell-1)}$, and $X^{(\ell-1)}$ in (7), this constraint in the $\ell$-th iteration is relaxed as
\[
(X^{(\ell-1)})^H X^{(\ell-1)} \geq v^{(\ell-1)} \text{Tr} (X^{(\ell)}).
\]

The non-convexity of constraint (11b) arises from the highly coupled terms $\alpha_m^2 \beta_m$ and $(1 - \alpha_m^2) \beta_m$. Using the penalty function method, with the introduced slack variables $\xi_{m,A}$ and $\xi_{m,J}$, (11b) is equivalently recast as
\[
[X]_{m,m} = \begin{cases} 
\xi_{m,A}, & \text{if } X = U_A, \\
\xi_{m,J}, & \text{if } X = U_J,
\end{cases}
\]
(15a)
\[
\beta_m, & \text{if } X = U,
\]
(15b)
\[
\xi_{m,A} \leq \alpha^2 m \beta_m, \quad \xi_{m,J} \leq (1 - \alpha_m^2) \beta_m,
\]
(15c)
\[
\xi_{m,A} \geq \alpha^2 m \beta_m, \quad \xi_{m,J} \geq (1 - \alpha_m^2) \beta_m.
\]
(15d)

For the non-convex constraints in (15b), we apply the FTS at the feasible point $\{\alpha^{(\ell)}_m, \beta^{(\ell)}_m\}$ obtained in the $\ell$-th iteration. These constraints are then approximated by
\[
\xi_{m,A} \leq \xi_{m,A}^{ub}, \quad \xi_{m,J} \leq \xi_{m,J}^{ub},
\]
where $\xi_{m,A}^{ub} = 2(\alpha_m - \alpha_m^2) \alpha_m^{(\ell)} \beta_m + (1 - \alpha_m^2) \beta_m$ and $\xi_{m,J}^{ub} = (\beta_m - \alpha_m^2 \alpha_m^{(\ell)} - 2\beta_m^{(\ell)} (\alpha_m^2 - \alpha_m^{(\ell)})). (1 - \alpha_m^2)$. We next adopt the convex upper bound (CUB) substitution to deal with (15c).

Define functions $f(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha^2 \beta$ and $g(\alpha, \beta) = \frac{\alpha^2 + \beta^2}{2}$. Then, it is proved that $g(\alpha, \beta)$ is a convex overestimate of $f(\alpha, \beta)$ for $\alpha, \beta, C > 0$. Moreover, the equations $f(\alpha, \beta) = g(\alpha, \beta)$ and $\nabla f(\alpha, \beta) = \nabla g(\alpha, \beta)$ hold when $C = \frac{\alpha^2}{\beta}$, where $\nabla f$ is the gradient of $f$. Thus, by replacing the non-convex terms with their CUBs, constraints in (15c) are transformed into
\[
\xi_{m,A} \leq \xi_{m,A}^{CUB}, \quad \xi_{m,J} \leq \xi_{m,J}^{CUB},
\]
where $\xi_{m,A}^{CUB} = \frac{C_{\text{ub}}}{2} \alpha^2 + \frac{\beta^2}{2}$ and $\xi_{m,J}^{CUB} = \frac{C_{\text{ub}}}{2} \beta^2 + \frac{\beta^2}{2}$.
The fixed points $C_{m,A}$ and $C_{m,l}$ in the $\ell$-th iteration are updated by $C^{(\ell)}_{m,A}=\frac{\beta^{(\ell-1)}}{1-\alpha^{(\ell-1)}}$ and $C^{(\ell)}_{m,l}=\frac{\beta^{(\ell-1)}}{1-\alpha^{(\ell-1)}\lambda}$, respectively.

As a result, problem (12) is reformulated to

$$\max_{\Delta_i} R_k^{lb} - \max_{k \in K} R_k$$

s.t. $\Delta_i \leq \Delta_i^{lb} + b_m$, $\xi_{m,\lambda} \leq \xi_{m,\lambda}^{lb} + b_m$, $\forall m$, $\Delta_i \leq \Delta_i^{lb} + b_m$, $\forall m$, $\xi_{m,\lambda} + c_m \leq \xi_{m,\lambda}^{lb} + b_m$, $\forall m$, $\beta_m \in [0, \beta_{\max}]$, $0 \leq \alpha_m \leq 1$, $\forall m$, $X \geq 0$, $[U_A]_{M+1,M+1} = 1$, $\forall \alpha_m + (\alpha_m^{lb})^{ub} \leq 0, \forall m, (12b)-(12e), (14), (15a)-(18f)$

where $\Delta_i = \{X, E_i, F_i, b_m, c_m, \xi_{m,\lambda}, \xi_{m,\lambda}^{lb}, \forall m\}$. Here, $G(b_m, \bar{c}_m, \bar{e}_m)$ is the penalty term added into the objective function, which is scaled by the multiplier $\mu^{(\ell)}$ in $\ell$-th iteration. Considering that problem (18) is an SDP, we can adopt the CVX toolbox to solve it efficiently. The algorithm for solving (12) can be extended from Algorithm for 1 and is omitted here for brevity.

**C. MF-RS Location Optimization**

Given $f, A$, and $\Theta$, the MF-RS location optimization subproblem is formulated as

$$\max_{w, E_i, F_i} R_k^{lb} - \max_{k \in K} R_k$$

s.t. $E_i^{(1)} - \|h^T \|_F^2, (E_i^{(1)})^{lb} \leq \|h^T \|_F^2, \forall k$, $F_k \geq P_i \|g_k^H \Theta_k\|_F^2 + \sigma_i^2 \|g_k\|_F^2 + \sigma_0^2$, $F_k \geq P_i \|g_k^H \Theta_k\|_F^2 + \sigma_i^2 \|g_k\|_F^2 + \sigma_0^2, \forall k, (19d)$

$w \in W_k, (4b)$

Following [3], $H_k$ and $g_k^T$ are related to the AoDs and AoAs of the BS-RIS and RIS-user links, respectively, which are nonlinear and complex w.r.t. and thus make (19) intractable. To tackle it, we obtain the $\omega$ obtained in the $(\ell-1)$-iteration is used to approximate $H_k$ and $g_k^T$ in the $\ell$-th iteration. Defining $\hat{H} = \sqrt{\frac{\rho_k}{\rho_1}} H^{1} + \sqrt{\frac{\rho_k}{\rho_1}} H^{NL}$ and $\hat{g}_k = \sqrt{\frac{\rho_k}{\rho_1}} g_k^H + \sqrt{\frac{\rho_k}{\rho_1}} g_k^H$, constraints (19b)-(19d) and (4b) are rewritten as

$$P_k \geq d_k^{\alpha_0} g_k \|h^T \|_F^2, F_k \leq \|\hat{g}_k\|_F^2 + \sigma_0^2,\forall k$$

where $d_k = \|\hat{g}_k\|_F^2$.

Constrains (20a) and (20b) are still non-convex w.r.t. $w$. Thus, we introduce a slack variable set $\Delta = \{u, \bar{u}, l, s, e, r\}$, and define $d_i = \{1, s_i\}$, satisfying $u = \bar{u} = \min\{u_i, \bar{u}_i\}$, $t_i = t_i^{\min}$, $t_i = t_i^{\max}$, $\bar{u}_i = \bar{u}_i$, $\bar{u}_i = \bar{u}_i$, $e_i = d_i^{\alpha_0}$, and $r_i = d_i D_i d_i^T$. And then, constraints (20a) and (20b) are transformed into

$$u \leq d_i^{\min}, t_i \leq d_i^{\max}, \bar{u}_i \leq d_i^{\min}, \bar{u}_i \leq d_i^{\max}, e_i \leq d_i^{\alpha_0}, s_i \leq \bar{u}_i t_i, r_i \leq d_i D_i d_i^T, (21a)$$

$s_i \leq \bar{u}_i t_i, r_i \leq d_i D_i d_i^T, (21b)$

$$P_k \geq u^{\min} g_k, (E_i^{(1)})^{lb} \leq r_i, F_k \leq e_i g_k + \sigma_0^2, (E_i^{(1)} + 2) k \geq r_k, F_k \leq e_i g_k + \sigma_0^2, (21d)$$

Constraints in (21a), constraints $r_i \leq d_i D_i d_i^T$ and $s_i \geq \bar{u}_i t_i$ in (21b) are non-convex. The non-convexity of $s_i \geq \bar{u}_i t_i$ arises from its quasi-concave term $\bar{u}_i t_i$. Similar to the transformation for (15c) in Section III-B, we reduce the term with its CUB $(\bar{u}_i t_i)^{ub} = \frac{C_k a_k^2}{2 + \frac{2}{\alpha_k}}$, where $C_k$ is updated by $C_k^{(t)} = \frac{\beta_k}{\lambda_0^{(t)}}$.

To facilitate the derivation of constraints in (21a), we unfold them as (22) as shown at the bottom of this page. The SCA method is adopted to handle $r_i \leq d_i D_i d_i^T$. For the given point $(\tilde{d}_i, \tilde{u}_i, (E_i^{(1)})^{lb}, (y_i^{(1)})^{lb})$, the FTs of $d_i D_i d_i^T$, $u^{\min} t_i, t_i^{\max}, e_i^{\min}, e_i^{\max}, x^2, y^2, z^2$ are given in (23) at the bottom of this page. Then, by replacing these terms with their FTs in (23), constraints $r_i \leq d_i D_i d_i^T$ and (22) are rewritten as their convex approximations $r_i \leq (d_i D_i d_i^T)^{lb}$ and (23').

The expression of (23') is omitted here for brevity. Finally, problem (19) is recast as the following convex one:

$$\max_{\Delta, w, E_i, F_i} R_k^{lb} - \max_{k \in K} R_k$$

s.t. $s_k \leq \bar{u}_i t_i, r_k \leq d_i D_i d_i^T, (24a)$

$s_k \geq (\bar{u}_i t_i)^{ub}, r_k \geq d_i D_i d_i^T, \forall k, (24c)$

$w \in W_k, (21c), (21d), (23').$

The solution of problem (4) can be obtained by solving problems (6), (12), and (19) alternatively. Since the maximum transmit power is limited, the proposed algorithm is upper bounded and guaranteed to converge. The overall complexity is $O(I_0(I_1(N^2+2K+2)^{3.5}+I_2(3M^2+8M+2K+3)^{3.5}+I_3(6K+11)^{5.5}))$, where $I_0, I_1, I_2$, and $I_3$ denote the number of outer iterations required for convergence, and the numbers of inner iterations required for solving (6), (12), and (19), respectively.

**IV. SIMULATION RESULTS**

In this section, numerical results are provided to demonstrate the performance of the proposed UAV-mounted MF-RIS-aided secure communication system. We consider a UAV deployable range of $\{x, y, z\}^T \leq 0 \leq x, y, z \leq 100\}$ m. The horizontal coordinates of Eves are randomly distributed on the line from $[x, -3, 50]$ m to $[x, 3, 50]$ m. Unless otherwise stated, we set $x = 80$, $P_{max} = 30$ dBm,
$M = 60$, $P_3 = 0$ dBm, and $\beta_{\text{max}} = 10$ dB [4]. Other parameters are summarized in Table II, where $\kappa_i, \forall i \in \{b\} \cup K$, denote the path loss exponents of the links from the BS to Bob/Eves. For comparison, we consider the UAV-mounted passive [3] and active RISs [4] as benchmarks.

Fig. 2 shows the RIS deployment versus $x_c$. We consider case 1 with $x_c = 70$ and case 2 with $x_c = 80$. We reveal the deployment characteristics of different RISs by comparing their deployment changes in these two cases. It is observed that in both cases, the active RIS prefers to be deployed closer to Bob and is less affected by Eves’ movement. However, the MF-RIS is deployed near Eves and often located directly above Eves. The reasons are given as follows: 1) Equipped with the capacity of emitting jamming, the MF-RIS is able to directly suppress strong illegal eavesdropping and safeguard wireless communications. 2) However, the active RIS can only mitigate eavesdropping to a limited extent while enhancing legitimate reception. This reveals the potential of the proposed MF-RIS for combating eavesdropping in the presence of multiple Eves.

Fig. 3 depicts the secrecy rate versus $P_{\text{max}}$ and $M$. Overall, it is observed from all results that the proposed MF-RIS always outperforms the benchmarks, while the passive RIS appears to be the worst. Even in the case of low transmit power and small RIS size (e.g., $P_{\text{max}}=10$ dBm and $M=30$), the MF-RIS can attain 2.94 and 3.69 times performance gains over active and passive RISs, respectively. For passive and active RISs, when $M$ is fixed and $P_{\text{max}}$ goes to $\infty$, the secrecy rate converges to a constant. This shows that only increasing the signal power is insufficient for security enhancement, and introducing the jamming emission function at the MF-RIS is critical.

Fig. 4 illustrates the RIS element allocation versus $\beta_{\text{max}}$. When $\beta_{\text{max}}$ is small, in order to effectively combat serious eavesdropping, the MF-RIS tends to allocate most of the elements to operate in J mode. As $\beta_{\text{max}}$ increases, the MF-RIS expands the element size in A mode to enhance legitimate reception, due to the increase in the power of the reflected signal and the generated jamming signal. This also reveals that the proposed MF-RIS provides additional DoFs for system design, allowing us to flexibly allocate element resources according to various application scenarios.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper proposed a UAV-mounted mounted MF-RIS architecture enabling simultaneous signal reflection, amplification, and friendly jamming. A secrecy rate maximization problem was formulated in a UAV-mounted MF-RIS assisted secure communication system by jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming at the BS and the deployment of MF-RIS. Simulation results revealed that the proposed MF-RIS obtains 2.94 and 3.69 times gains over active and passive RISs, respectively.

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